

**UNITED STATES DELEGATION  
TO THE  
JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, DC 20451**

Geneva, Switzerland  
December 19, 1991

**JOINT STATEMENT ON DESIGNATIONS FOR PARKING SITES<sup>1</sup>**

The Parties note that subparagraph 1(b) of Article XII of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, refers to designations for parking sites that are provided for in Annex A to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding. The Parties agree that, in the first data update of the Memorandum of Understanding after entry into force of the Treaty, the format for the category of data for parking sites at ICBM bases for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs in Annex A to the Memorandum of Understanding shall be changed by introducing the designation for each parking site.

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Soviet Component  
of the Joint Compliance  
and Inspection Commission

Geneva, Switzerland  
December 19, 1991

**JOINT STATEMENT ON DESIGNATIONS FOR PARKING SITES**

The Parties note that subparagraph 1(b) of Article XII of the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, refers to designations for parking sites that are provided for in Annex A to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding. The Parties agree that, in the first data update of the Memorandum of Understanding after entry into force of the Treaty, the format for the category of data for parking sites at ICBM bases for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs in Annex A to the Memorandum of Understanding shall be changed by introducing the designation of each parking site.

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<sup>1</sup> This statement and the accompanying statement by the USSR jointly comprise Joint Statement Number 1.

Geneva, Switzerland  
October 23, 1992

**JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION  
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER 2**

**ON CONSENT TO BE BOUND BY JCIC AGREEMENTS**

The Parties understand the provisions of subparagraph 6(c) of Annex 1 to the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, as set forth in Article One of Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Agreement Number 1, concerning the consent of a Party that did not sign an agreement to be bound by that agreement, to mean that, in the circumstances existing at the time of signature of that agreement, the practical activities provided for by that agreement need not be performed by that Party and that Party shall not be held responsible for any failure by Parties that signed the agreement, to fulfill the obligations under that agreement.

[Initialed]

(United States of America)\_\_\_ Steven Steiner  
(Republic of Belarus)\_\_\_ Andrey Sannikov  
(Republic of Kazakhstan)\_\_\_ Kasymzhomart Tokayev  
(Russian Federation)\_\_\_ Gennadiy Shabannikov  
(Ukraine)\_\_\_ Konstantin Hrishchenko

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Geneva, Switzerland  
October 23, 1992

**JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION  
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER 3**

**ON THE INSPECTABILITY OF SILO TRAINING LAUNCHERS**

The Parties note that, in having agreed that silo training launchers may be shown on site diagrams within the boundaries of the inspection site, and in having agreed that silo training launchers nonetheless shall not be subject to inspection, they have done so as one of the few exceptions to the general rule that everything within the boundary shown on a site diagram is inspectable, as provided for in the Inspection Protocol.

[Initialed]

(United States of America)\_\_\_ Steven Steiner  
(Republic of Belarus)\_\_\_ Andrey Sannikov  
(Republic of Kazakhstan)\_\_\_ Kasymzhomart Tokayev  
(Russian Federation)\_\_\_ Gennadiy Shabannikov  
(Ukraine)\_\_\_ Konstantin Hrishchenko

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*United States Department of State*

Geneva, Switzerland  
October 23, 1992

**JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION  
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER 4**

**ON NORMAL PRACTICE FOR CARGO EXAMINATION**

The Parties note that, pursuant to paragraph 3 of Annex 7 to the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol, cargoes consisting of equipment and supplies listed in the inventory provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Annex 7 to the Inspection Protocol may, at the choice of the inspected Party, be examined at the point of entry, at the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, or directly at such a facility.

The Parties understand that the normal practice of the Parties will be to examine such cargoes at the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility.

[Initialed]

(United States of America)\_\_\_ Steven Steiner  
(Republic of Belarus)\_\_\_ Andrey Sannikov  
(Republic of Kazakhstan)\_\_\_ Kasymzhomart Tokayev  
(Russian Federation)\_\_\_ Gennadiy Shabannikov  
(Ukraine)\_\_\_ Konstantin Hrishchenko

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Geneva, Switzerland  
November 19, 1992

**JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION  
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER 5**

**ON THE AGREED FORM FOR JCIC AGREEMENTS**

The Parties to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, namely, the United States of America, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, agree that the form of Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission agreements that are not signed by all Parties to the Treaty shall follow the form of Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Agreement Number 6 and shall include the following:

(a) In the preamble:

"The Governments of the Parties to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and

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*United States Department of State*

Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty,"

"Acting in accordance with the Treaty,"

"Have agreed as follows:"

(b) In the final article:

"This Agreement shall enter into force on the date when the United States of America, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine have consented to be bound by this Agreement, and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force."

"Signature of this Agreement for the Government of a Party shall express the consent of that Party to be bound by this Agreement. The consent of \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ (the non-signatories) to be bound by this Agreement shall be expressed by their Governments in accordance with paragraph 6 of Annex 1 to the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to the Treaty."

In addition, such agreements shall include signature blocks only for those Parties that sign the agreement.

The Parties further agree that, for Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission joint statements that record agreements, the initialing of such a joint statement for the Government of a Party shall express the consent of that Party to be bound by the joint statement. In the event that the joint statement is not initialed by all the Parties to the Treaty, the following paragraph shall be included in the joint statement: "The consent of \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ (Parties not initialing) to be bound by this Joint Statement shall be expressed by their Governments in accordance with paragraph 6 of Annex 1 to the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to the Treaty."

The Parties may agree to use other forms of documents for recording agreements, as provided for in Section V of the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the JCIC Protocol.

The consent of the Republic of Belarus and the Republic of Kazakhstan to be bound by this Joint Statement shall be expressed by their Governments in accordance with paragraph 6 of Annex 1 to the JCIC Protocol.

[Initialed]  
(United States of America)\_\_\_\_ Steven Steiner  
(Russian Federation)\_\_\_\_ Gennadiy Shabannikov  
(Ukraine)\_\_\_\_ Konstantin Hrishchenko

Geneva, Switzerland  
November 19, 1992

**JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION  
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER 6**

**ON THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE APPLICATION OF RIGHTS AND  
OBLIGATIONS**

The Parties understand that, when, pursuant to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, certain rights and obligations under the Treaty begin to apply a specific number of days after an event, those rights and obligations shall begin to apply at 00:00 hours, Greenwich Mean Time, after the expiration of the specific number of days specified in the Treaty. Such specific number of days shall be counted from the day following the day of the event specified in the Treaty.

The consent of the Republic of Belarus and the Republic of Kazakhstan to be bound by this Joint Statement shall be expressed by their Governments in accordance with paragraph 6 of Annex 1 to the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to the Treaty.

[Initialed]  
(United States of America)\_\_\_ Steven Steiner  
(Russian Federation)\_\_\_ Gennadiy Shabannikov  
(Ukraine)\_\_\_ Konstantin Hrishchenko

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Geneva, Switzerland  
November 19, 1992

**JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION  
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER 7**

**ON THE INSPECTABILITY OF ICBM EMPLACEMENT EQUIPMENT**

The Parties understand that information about ICBM emplacement equipment that is specified for an inspection site, but that is absent from the inspection site at the time of the arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site, shall be provided during the pre-inspection briefing, along with the reason for its absence, pursuant to subparagraph 8(d) of Section VII of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991.

The Parties further understand that, pursuant to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty:

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*United States Department of State*

- (a) ICBM emplacement equipment that is specified for an inspection site is not required to be located within the inspection site;
- (b) ICBM emplacement equipment that is specified for an inspection site, but that is absent from the inspection site at the time of the arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site, is not required to return to the inspection site during the period of inspection; and
- (c) ICBM emplacement equipment is not subject to inspection while it is located outside the inspection site.

The consent of the Republic of Belarus and the Republic of Kazakhstan to be bound by this Joint Statement shall be expressed by their Governments in accordance with paragraph 6 of Annex 1 to the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to the Treaty.

[Initialed]

(United States of America)\_\_\_ Steven Steiner  
(Russian Federation)\_\_\_ Gennadiy Shabannikov  
(Ukraine)\_\_\_ Konstantin Hrishchenko

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Geneva, Switzerland  
April 14, 1993

**JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION  
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER 8**

**ON TRAINING MODELS OF MISSILES**

The Parties understand that training models of missiles differ from ICBMs or SLBMs of corresponding types on the basis of the following declared external and functional differences that are visible during inspections conducted pursuant to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty:

- (a) for training models of Peacekeeper, Poseidon, Trident I, and Trident II types of missiles, one hole, no less than 25 millimeters in diameter, drilled through the casing of the first stage rocket motor and into the inert propellant;
- (b) for training models of Minuteman II and Minuteman III types of missiles, a triangular notch, no less than ten centimeters in height, as measured from the edge of the nozzle, in one of the nozzles of the first stage rocket motor;
- (c) for training models of SS-24 and SS-25 types of missiles, two holes, each no less than 15 millimeters in diameter, drilled through the launch canister, in the region of the first stage rocket motor; and, coaxial with

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*United States Department of State*

one of these two holes, one hole, no less than ten millimeters in diameter, drilled through the casing of the first stage rocket motor and into the inert propellant;

- (d) for training models of SS-11 and SS-19 types of missiles, one hole, no less than ten millimeters in diameter, drilled through each nozzle of the first stage rocket motor, near the edge of the nozzle;
- (e) for training models of SS-17 and SS-18 types of missiles, one hole in the launch canister, no less than 15 millimeters in diameter, and one hole, no less than ten millimeters in diameter, drilled through the first stage propellant section through the hole in the launch canister;
- (f) for training models of SS-N-6, SS-N-8, SS-N-18 and SS-N-23 types of missiles:
  - (i) the absence of the nozzle on the first stage rocket motor; or
  - (ii) if the training model has the nozzle on the first stage rocket motor, two holes, each no less than ten millimeters in diameter, drilled through the nozzle near its edge;
- (g) for training models of SS-N-20 type of missiles, one hole, no less than ten millimeters in diameter, drilled through the casing of the first stage rocket motor and into the inert propellant, or one of the differences provided for in subparagraph (f) of this paragraph.

Nothing in this Joint Statement shall be deemed to prejudice the right of each Party to declare other external and functional differences to differentiate training models of missiles from ICBMs or SLBMs of the corresponding type.

The Parties agree that, for existing and new types of ICBMs and SLBMs, all declarations of differences between training models of missiles and ICBMs or SLBMs of the corresponding types shall be subject to discussion in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

To assist inspectors, the Parties shall either provide a photograph of each of the differences of training models of missiles or, if a photograph of any of such differences has not been provided prior to the first inspection of an item declared to be a training model of a missile on the basis of such a difference, the inspected Party shall provide to the inspecting Party, during that inspection, a photograph of the difference, taken in accordance with paragraph 18 of Section VI of, and Subsection B of Section VI of Annex 8 to, the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty.

The consent of Ukraine to be bound by this Joint Statement shall be expressed by its Government in accordance with paragraph 6 of Annex 1 to the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to the Treaty.

[Initialed]  
(United States of America)\_\_\_ Steven Steiner  
(Republic of Belarus)\_\_\_ Andrey Sannikov  
(Republic of Kazakhstan)\_\_\_ Kasymzhomart Tokayev  
(Russian Federation)\_\_\_ Gennadiy Shabannikov

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Geneva, Switzerland  
April 14, 1993

**JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION  
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER 9**

**ON ADDITIONAL CONFIRMATION OF  
THE DIMENSIONS OF FIRST STAGES OF SLBMS**

The Parties understand that each exhibition conducted pursuant to Annex 13 to the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol, shall be a one-time exhibition, provided that, as a result of each such exhibition, the United States of America confirms, in accordance with the procedures provided for in Annex 13 to the Inspection Protocol, that the SLBM being exhibited is an SLBM of the declared type and that the dimensions of the SLBM stages being confirmed pursuant to Annex 13 to the Inspection Protocol correspond to the data specified for those items in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991.

The consent of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to be bound by this Joint Statement shall be expressed by their Governments in accordance with paragraph 6 of Annex 1 to the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to the Treaty.

[Initialed]  
(United States of America)\_\_\_ Steven Steiner  
(Russian Federation)\_\_\_ Gennadiy Shabannikov

Geneva, Switzerland  
April 14, 1993

**JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION  
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER 10**

**ON THE AGREEMENT OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS OF U.S.  
EQUIPMENT FOR THE CONDUCT OF CONTINUOUS MONITORING  
ACTIVITIES AT THE VOTKINSK MACHINE BUILDING PLANT, VOTKINSK,  
RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

The Parties understand that the list of equipment provided to the Parties by the United States of America in the document titled "U.S. Equipment for Use at the Votkinsk Continuous Monitoring Facility at the Beginning of Continuous Monitoring Activity" on October 15, 1992, fulfills the obligation of the United States of America pursuant to paragraph 17 of Section VI of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol, to provide to the inspected Party through diplomatic channels a list of items of equipment provided for in Annex 8 or 9 to the Inspection Protocol indicating the manufacturer's name and the model.

Pursuant to paragraph 17 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol, the Parties agree that the technical specifications for the U.S. equipment listed in Annexes 8 and 9 to the Inspection Protocol, provided to the Parties by the United States of America in the document titled "Technical Specifications of U.S. Equipment for the Conduct of Continuous Monitoring Activities" on October 15, 1992, shall be the technical specifications for the equipment specified on the list provided to the Parties by the United States of America in the document titled "U.S. Equipment for Use at the Votkinsk Continuous Monitoring Facility at the Beginning of Continuous Monitoring Activity" on October 15, 1992.

The Parties further understand that this Joint Statement does not relieve the inspecting Party from the obligation to provide documentation pursuant to paragraph 25 of Section XVI of the Inspection Protocol, and does not require the United States of America to bring to the territory of the inspected Party all the items of equipment.

The consent of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to be bound by this Joint Statement shall be expressed by their Governments in accordance with paragraph 6 of Annex 1 to the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

[Initialed]  
(United States of America)\_\_\_ Steven Steiner  
(Russian Federation)\_\_\_ Gennadiy Shabannikov

Geneva, Switzerland  
October 14, 1993

**JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION  
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER 11**

**ON THE PRE-INSPECTION RESTRICTIONS AT YAGEL'NAYA AND OLEN'YA  
SUBMARINE BASES**

The Parties agree that, as an exception to the provisions in Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Agreement Number 13, the pre-inspection restriction zones for the Yagel'naya and Olen'ya submarine bases shall be separated as follows: The five-kilometer pre-inspection restriction zone for the Yagel'naya submarine base shall not extend to the entrance of the Olen'ya inlet beyond the intersection of the five-kilometer arc associated with this zone with the five-kilometer arc that is associated with the pre-inspection restriction zone for the Olen'ya submarine base and that abuts on the peninsula between the entrances to the Sayda inlet and the Olen'ya inlet; and the five-kilometer pre-inspection restriction zone for the Olen'ya submarine base shall not extend beyond the intersection of the five-kilometer arc associated with this zone with the peninsula between the entrances to the Sayda inlet and the Olen'ya inlet.

The Parties therefore understand that the provisions of paragraph 4 and subparagraph 8(d) of Section IX of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, regarding pre-inspection restrictions and procedures for reentry vehicle inspections, do not apply to ballistic missile submarines at the Yagel'naya Submarine Base when the Olen'ya Submarine Base has been designated as the inspection site subject to a reentry vehicle inspection, and *vice-versa*.

The consent of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to be bound by this Joint Statement shall be expressed by their Governments in accordance with paragraph 6 of Annex 1 to the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to the Treaty.

[Initialed]  
(United States of America)\_\_\_ Steven Steiner  
(Russian Federation)\_\_\_ Mikhail Strel'tsov

Geneva, Switzerland  
October 14, 1993

**JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION  
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER 12**

**ON PROCEDURES FOR REFUELING IL-76 INSPECTION AIRPLANES AT  
ANCHORAGE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, ANCHORAGE, ALASKA**

With respect to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties agree that routes to San Francisco, California, via Anchorage, Alaska, specified by the United States of America in subparagraph 10(b) of Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, shall be used only for flights of IL-76 inspection airplanes. The Parties further agree that, when the IL-76 airplane used pursuant to paragraph 3 or 4 of Section IV of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol, lands to refuel at Anchorage International Airport, Anchorage, Alaska:

- (a) The inspecting Party shall specify in the notifications provided in accordance with paragraphs 3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, and 24 of Section III of the Inspection Protocol, and in the notification, agreed by the Parties, of the intention to conduct a special START flight, its intent to use an IL-76 airplane and the estimated time of arrival at Anchorage International Airport.
- (b) Anchorage shall not be considered a point of entry under the Treaty.
- (c) Refueling shall be routinely conducted at the remote refueling station at the Anchorage International Airport. Inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members shall not deplane.
- (d) If refueling is required at a terminal gate, inspectors and monitors shall deplane and remain in the United States Customs holding room until refueling is complete. Baggage shall remain on the airplane throughout the layover of the airplane at Anchorage International Airport.
- (e) All costs associated with the refueling at Anchorage International Airport shall be paid by the inspecting Party directly to the commercial entity that provided such goods and services, as is done for regularly scheduled commercial flights.
- (f) If a mechanical breakdown occurs, the inspecting Party shall arrange and pay for necessary repairs.
- (g) If a delay occurs due to mechanical breakdown or circumstances brought about by force majeure that would require the United States of America to provide escorts, meals, lodging, and transportation for inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members, the costs of these services

shall be paid by the inspecting Party. The United States of America shall submit to the inspecting Party separate bills for these costs, since they will fall outside the obligations contained in the Treaty.

The consent of the Republic of Kazakhstan and Ukraine to be bound by this Joint Statement shall be expressed by their Governments in accordance with paragraph 6 of Annex 1 to the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to the Treaty.

[Initialed]

(United States of America)\_\_\_ Steven Steiner

(Republic of Belarus)\_\_\_ Alexandr Baichorov

(Russian Federation)\_\_\_ Mikhail Strel'tsov

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Geneva, Switzerland

October 14, 1993

**JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION  
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER 13**

**ON THE AGREEMENT OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS OF U.S.  
EQUIPMENT FOR THE CONDUCT OF CONTINUOUS MONITORING  
ACTIVITIES AT THE PAVLOGRAD MACHINE PLANT, PAVLOGRAD,  
UKRAINE**

The Parties understand that the list of equipment provided to the Parties by the United States of America in the document titled "U.S. Equipment for Use at the Pavlograd Continuous Monitoring Facility" on October 15, 1992, fulfills the obligation of the United States of America pursuant to paragraph 17 of Section VI of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol, to provide to the inspected Party through diplomatic channels a list of items of equipment provided for in Annex 8 or 9 to the Inspection Protocol indicating the manufacturer's name and the model.

Pursuant to paragraph 17 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol, the Parties agree that the technical specifications for the U.S. equipment listed in Annexes 8 and 9 to the Inspection Protocol, provided to the Parties by the United States of America in the document titled "Technical Specifications of U.S. Equipment for the Conduct of Continuous Monitoring Activities" on October 15, 1992, shall be the technical specifications for the equipment specified on the list provided to the Parties by the United States of America in the document titled "U.S. Equipment for Use at the Pavlograd Continuous Monitoring Facility" on October 15, 1992.

The Parties further understand that this Joint Statement does not relieve the inspecting Party from the obligation to provide documentation pursuant to

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*United States Department of State*

paragraph 25 of Section XVI of the Inspection Protocol, and does not require the United States of America to bring to the territory of the inspected Party all the items of equipment.

The consent of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and the Russian Federation to be bound by this Joint Statement shall be expressed by their Governments in accordance with paragraph 6 of Annex 1 to the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

[Initialed]  
(United States of America)\_\_\_ Steven Steiner  
(Ukraine)\_\_\_ Konstantin Hrishchenko

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Geneva, Switzerland  
May 4, 1994

**JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION  
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER 14**

**ON THE CAPABILITIES OF SATELLITE SYSTEM RECEIVERS TO PROVIDE  
INFORMATION ON THE COORDINATES OF SILO LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS**

With respect to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties understand that, for Subsection E of Section VI of Annex 8 to the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty, the inspected Party shall ensure that the satellite system receivers are capable of providing information on the coordinates of the silo launchers of ICBMs located on its territory, at any time when a satellite signal necessary for use by such satellite system receivers is available.

[Initialed]  
(United States of America)\_\_\_ Steven Steiner  
(Republic of Belarus)\_\_\_ Andrey Sannikov  
(Republic of Kazakhstan)\_\_\_ Kairtay Zhanbatyrov  
(Russian Federation)\_\_\_ Mikhail Strel'tsov  
(Ukraine)\_\_\_ Konstantin Hrishchenko

Geneva, Switzerland  
May 4, 1994

**JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION  
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER 15**

**ON THE ISSUE OF THE SS-N-8 SLBM AT SLBM STORAGE FACILITIES**

With respect to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties understand that during baseline data inspections, data update inspections, or new facility inspections, assembled SS-N-8 SLBMs without front sections may be located at declared facilities without the detachable front portion of the missile, in which the missile's guidance and control system instruments are located, and that the inspecting Party will not require the attachment of such front portion to the missile in order to confirm the type of such SLBMs during an inspection.

The Parties understand that the photographs of the SS-N-8 SLBM without the detachable front portion of the missile and the declared data on the length of the missile in this configuration, which is 12.1 meters, which were transmitted by the Russian Federation to the United States of America on December 21, 1993, may be used by the United States of America during baseline data inspections, data update inspections, or new facility inspections only for the purpose of confirming this type of SLBM.

The Parties understand that the following length measurement was used to obtain the 12.1 meter length declared for this missile in such configuration: the distance from the edge of the main engine nozzle of the first stage to the place where the missile joins the detachable front portion of the missile.

The Parties agree that when an SS-N-8 SLBM without the detachable front portion of the missile is first encountered during an inspection conducted by the United States of America, the United States of America shall have the right to confirm the declared 12.1 meter length.

The Parties understand that along with the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, the Russian Federation will provide the text of a footnote specifying the 12.1 meter length declared for the missile in such configuration. In subparagraph (a)(ii) of Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, the number of such footnote will be superscripted after the first mention of the SLBM type designation "SS-N-8".

The consent of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to be bound by this Joint Statement shall be expressed by their Governments in accordance with paragraph 6 of Annex 1 to the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to the Treaty.

[Initialed]  
(United States of America)\_\_\_ Steven Steiner  
(Russian Federation)\_\_\_ Mikhail Strel'stov

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Geneva, Switzerland  
October 13, 1994

**JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION  
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER 16**

**ON INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED TO INSPECTORS UPON THEIR  
ARRIVAL AT THE INSPECTION SITE**

With respect to paragraph 3 of Section VI of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol, the Parties understand that the requirement to annotate a copy of the site diagram to indicate the location at the inspection site of the items specified in paragraph 8 of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol, applies only to such items that are located within the boundaries of the inspection site.

In this regard, and for the purposes of paragraphs 6, 8, and 16 of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol, the Parties agree that ballistic missile submarines, missile tenders, storage cranes, and SLBM launchers located in the waters of a submarine base:

- (a) shall not be considered to be within the boundaries of the inspection site;
- (b) shall not be subject to pre-inspection restrictions;
- (c) shall not be indicated on the annotated site diagram provided to the inspection team leader; and
- (d) shall not be subject to inspection.

[Initialed]  
(United States of America)\_\_\_ Steven Steiner  
(Republic of Belarus)\_\_\_ Aleksandr Baichorov  
(Republic of Kazakhstan)\_\_\_ Kairtay Zhanbatyrov  
(Russian Federation)\_\_\_ Mikhail Strel'tsov  
(Ukraine)\_\_\_ Konstantin Hrishchenko

Geneva, Switzerland  
October 13, 1994

**JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION  
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER 17**

**ON CHANGES IN THE FUNCTIONS OF FACILITIES**

With respect to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties understand that each Party shall have the right to change the functions of facilities, specified by that Party in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding.

The Parties understand that, for facilities, the functions of which are changed in the period between signature and entry into force of the Treaty, the changed functions of such facilities shall be included in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Notification Protocol. Revised site diagrams for such facilities shall be provided through diplomatic channels no later than 48 hours after such notification.

The Parties understand that, for facilities, the functions of which are changed after entry into force of the Treaty, the changed functions of such facilities shall be included in notifications provided in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 9 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. Such facilities shall be considered to be new facilities.

The Parties agree that changing the function of a facility shall not be considered to be its elimination and that a close-out inspection shall not be conducted at such a facility until its elimination.

The Parties understand that if, as a result of a change in the function of a facility, the size criteria used during the inspection of the facility in its new function increase, a Party shall not change the function of such a facility until procedures for the inspection of such a facility are agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

[Initialed]  
(United States of America)\_\_\_ Steven Steiner  
(Republic of Belarus)\_\_\_ Aleksandr Baichorov  
(Republic of Kazakhstan)\_\_\_ Kairtay Zhanbatyrov  
(Russian Federation)\_\_\_ Mikhail Strel'tsov  
(Ukraine)\_\_\_ Konstantin Hrishchenko

Geneva, Switzerland  
October 13, 1994

**JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION  
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER 18**

**ON EXCHANGE OF SITE DIAGRAMS OF FACILITIES**

With respect to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties understand that, for facilities which were not specified in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty but which were specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, the site diagrams for such facilities will be provided through diplomatic channels no later than 48 hours after such notification is provided.

[Initialed]

(United States of America)\_\_\_ Steven Steiner  
(Republic of Belarus)\_\_\_ Aleksandr Baichorov  
(Republic of Kazakhstan)\_\_\_ Kairtay Zhanbatyrov  
(Russian Federation)\_\_\_ Mikhail Strel'tsov  
(Ukraine)\_\_\_ Konstantin Hrishchenko

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Geneva, Switzerland  
February 3, 1995

**JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION  
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER 19**

**ON PROVISION OF NOTIFICATIONS THROUGH CONTINUOUS  
COMMUNICATION CHANNELS**

The Parties, referring to paragraph 4 of Article VIII of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, understand that, for providing and receiving notifications relating to the Treaty:

- (a) the United States of America shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center of the United States of America and the Russian Federation shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center of the Russian Federation;
- (b) the Republic of Belarus shall use the equivalent Continuous Communications Link of the Republic of Belarus;
- (c) the Republic of Kazakhstan shall use the equivalent Government-to-Government Communications Link of the Republic of Kazakhstan; and

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*United States Department of State*

- (d) Ukraine shall use the equivalent Government-to-Government Communications Link of Ukraine.

The Parties understand that the United States of America shall provide all of its notifications relating to the Treaty to the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine. The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine shall each provide all of its notifications relating to the Treaty to the United States of America.

The Parties understand that the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine shall exchange, by agreement among themselves, the notifications they have provided to the United States of America. The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine agree that the provisions concerning releasability of information, set forth in Annex 1 to the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Notification Protocol, shall apply to the information contained in the notifications received from each other.

The Parties understand that the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, by agreement among themselves, may use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, Continuous Communication Link, or Government-to-Government Communications Links, referred to in this Joint Statement for transmitting to the United States of America notifications relating to the Treaty on behalf of any or all of these Parties.

The Parties understand that the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine may, by agreement among themselves, transmit as a single notification, the data on aggregate numbers by the categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, provided in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine shall be responsible for the timely provision of accurate and complete data to each other in order to ensure the provision of the relevant notifications to the United States of America.

The Parties agree that, in transmitting such notifications, paragraph 1 of each such notification shall specify the designator of the Party providing the notification in fulfilling its obligations provided for in the Treaty. In this connection, the following designators shall be specified: for the United States of America -- ANC/STR; for the Republic of Belarus -- BNC/STR; for the Republic of Kazakhstan -- KNC/STR; for the Russian Federation -- RNC/STR; and for Ukraine -- UNC/STR.

The consent of Ukraine to be bound by this Joint Statement shall be expressed by its Government in accordance with paragraph 6 of Annex 1 to the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to the Treaty.

[Initialed]  
(United States of America)\_\_\_ Steven Steiner  
(Republic of Belarus)\_\_\_ Aleksandr Baichorov  
(Republic of Kazakhstan)\_\_\_ Kairtay Zhanbatyrov  
(Russian Federation)\_\_\_ Mikhail Strel'tsov

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Geneva, Switzerland  
September 28, 1995

**JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION  
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER 20**

**ON THE USE OF RADIATION DETECTION EQUIPMENT DURING REENTRY  
VEHICLE INSPECTIONS**

The Parties, referring to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, understand that during reentry vehicle inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty the radiation detection equipment provided for in Section II of Annex 8 to the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty may be used, at the discretion of the inspected Party, to demonstrate to the inspectors that an object contained in the front section and declared by the in-country escort to be a non-nuclear object is, in fact, non-nuclear.

The consent of Ukraine to be bound by this Joint Statement shall be expressed by its Government in accordance with paragraph 6 of Annex 1 to the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to the Treaty.

[Initialed]  
(United States of America)\_\_\_ Steven Steiner  
(Republic of Belarus)\_\_\_ Aleksandr Baichorov  
(Republic of Kazakhstan)<sup>1</sup>\_\_\_ Kairtay Zhanbatyrov  
(Russian Federation)\_\_\_ Viktor Trifonov

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Geneva, Switzerland  
September 28, 1995

**JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION  
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER 21**

**ON SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLES THAT INCORPORATE  
FIRST STAGES OF ICBMS OR SLBMS**

The Parties, referring to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of

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<sup>1</sup> Revised official spelling.

Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, confirm that the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM of a type specified in Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding, that is incorporated into a space launch vehicle is subject to the provisions of the Treaty, and that, for the purposes of the Treaty, such a space launch vehicle is subject to the provisions of the Treaty relating to ICBMs or SLBMs as an ICBM or SLBM of that type.

Pursuant to the authority to agree otherwise, as provided for in the Twenty-eighth Agreed Statement of the Agreed Statements Annex to the Treaty, the Parties shall agree, as appropriate and on a case-by-case basis, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, that the existence of a first stage of an ICBM or SLBM that is incorporated into a space launch vehicle, during such a space launch vehicle's maintenance, storage, and transportation, including maintenance, storage, and transportation of such a first stage that is incorporated into a space launch vehicle, located separately from other stages of an ICBM or SLBM, does not result in ICBMs or SLBMs of that type being considered, for the purposes of the Treaty, to be ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages.

On the above basis, the Parties agree that the existence of the first stage of an SS-25 ICBM that is incorporated into a space launch vehicle, designated by the Russian Federation as the "Start" space launch vehicle, in a configuration in which the first and second stages of an SS-25 ICBM, together with a new stage, are contained in one section of the launch canister of such a space launch vehicle, and the third stage of an SS-25 ICBM, together with another new stage, is contained in another section of the launch canister of such a space launch vehicle, and its exit as part of the "Start" space launch vehicle from the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant after March 1, 1995, do not result in SS-25 ICBMs thereafter being considered, for the purposes of the Treaty, to be ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages, provided that the sections of the launch canister of the "Start" space launch vehicle are maintained, stored, and transported together, solely in this configuration, until the "Start" space launch vehicle is prepared at a space launch facility or test range for launch. The Parties understand that the process of connecting two portions of the "Start" space launch vehicle in final preparation for its launch shall not be considered assembly for the purposes of the Treaty.

The Parties understand that an ICBM or SLBM used to deliver objects into the upper atmosphere or space, including a space launch vehicle that incorporates the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM, but which differs from such a type of ICBM or SLBM in terms of the number of stages, dimensions, type of propellant, launch weight or throw-weight, shall not be considered to be a variant of such a type of ICBM or SLBM or a new type of ICBM or SLBM, provided that such an ICBM or SLBM used for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space, including such a space launch vehicle that incorporates the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM, is not flight-tested with a reentry vehicle.

The Parties understand that technical data on space launch vehicles that incorporate the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM shall not be required in Annex F

to the Memorandum of Understanding, and that exhibitions of such space launch vehicles shall not be required.

The Parties agree on the provision, in advance, of information on ICBMs or SLBMs used to deliver objects into the upper atmosphere or space, including space launch vehicles that incorporate the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM. Such information shall include technical data, development plans, and photographs or, until such ICBMs and SLBMs, including such space launch vehicles, are available to be photographed, schematic drawings.

The Parties understand that any proposed changes to the telemetry requirements associated with an ICBM or SLBM used for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space, including a space launch vehicle that incorporates the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM, will be discussed and, where appropriate, agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, taking into account the provisions of the Treaty, including the Thirty-first Agreed Statement of the Agreed Statements Annex to the Treaty.

The Parties understand that the Treaty does not prohibit a Party from moving ICBMs or SLBMs used for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space, including space launch vehicles that incorporate the first stages of ICBMs or SLBMs, to a space launch facility outside its national territory. ICBMs or SLBMs used for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space, including space launch vehicles that incorporate the first stages of ICBMs or SLBMs, located at a space launch facility outside a Party's national territory, shall not be considered to be based at such a facility. The Party conducting such movement shall retain ownership and control of such ICBMs or SLBMs, including such space launch vehicles, as well as their launchers and support equipment.

The Parties further understand that a space launch vehicle that incorporates any stage of an ICBM or SLBM that is not a first stage of an ICBM or SLBM, and does not incorporate the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM, is not subject to the provisions of the Treaty.

The Parties shall discuss and, where appropriate, agree on, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, questions relating to ICBMs and SLBMs used for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space, including space launch vehicles that incorporate the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM.

[Initialed]

(United States of America)\_\_\_ Steven Steiner

(Republic of Belarus)\_\_\_ Aleksandr Baichorov

(Republic of Kazakhstan)\_\_\_ Kairtay Zhanbatyrov

(Russian Federation)\_\_\_ Viktor Trifonov

(Ukraine)\_\_\_ Anatoliy Shevtsov

Geneva, Switzerland  
May 8, 1996

**JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION  
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER 22**

**ON ADDITIONAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TRAINING MODELS OF THE  
SS-19 TYPE OF MISSILE AND ICBMS OF THE CORRESPONDING TYPE**

The Parties, referring to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, understand that, in addition to the differences between training models of missiles and ICBMs or SLBMs of the corresponding type that are set forth in Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Joint Statement Number 8, training models of the SS-19 type of missile differ from ICBMs of the corresponding type on the basis of the following declared external and functional differences that are visible during inspections conducted pursuant to the Treaty:

- (a) the absence of one or more nozzles on the first stage rocket motor, and the presence of one hole, no less than ten millimeters in diameter, drilled through each nozzle present on the first stage rocket motor, near the edge of the nozzle; or
- (b) the absence of the first stage rocket motor.

To assist inspectors, the Parties shall either provide a photograph of each of the additional differences of training models of the SS-19 type of missile, including each configuration provided for in subparagraph (a) of this Joint Statement, or, if a photograph of any of such differences, including any of the configurations provided for in subparagraph (a) of this Joint Statement, has not been provided prior to the first inspection of an item declared to be a training model of a missile on the basis of such a difference, the inspected Party shall provide to the inspecting Party, during that inspection, a photograph of the difference, including the configuration, if applicable, taken in accordance with paragraph 18 of Section VI of, and Subsection B of Section VI of Annex 8 to, the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty.

[Initialed]  
(United States of America)\_\_\_ Steven Steiner  
(Republic of Belarus)\_\_\_ Andrey Sannikov  
(Republic of Kazakstan)\_\_\_ Kairtay Zhanbatyrov  
(Russian Federation)\_\_\_ Viktor Trifonov  
(Ukraine)\_\_\_ Konstantin Hrishchenko

Geneva, Switzerland  
May 8, 1996

**JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION  
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER 23**

**ON FIRST STAGES WITHOUT NOZZLES ATTACHED OF U.S. ICBMS AND  
SLBMS**

The Parties, referring to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, understand that, during data update inspections, new facility inspections, or conversion or elimination inspections, first stages without nozzles attached of Minuteman II, Minuteman III, and Peacekeeper ICBMs and first stages without nozzles attached of Trident I and Trident II SLBMs may be located at declared facilities.

The Parties understand that a photograph of the first stage, in such configuration, of each of these missiles, and declared data on the length of the first stage without nozzles attached of each of these missiles, which will be provided by the United States of America to the other Parties, may be used by the inspecting Party during data update inspections, new facility inspections, or conversion or elimination inspections only for the purpose of confirming these types of ICBMs and SLBMs at declared facilities.

The Parties understand that the 6.5 meter length of the Minuteman II and Minuteman III ICBM first stages, the 7.4 meter length of the Peacekeeper ICBM first stage, the 4.4 meter length of the Trident I SLBM first stage, and the 6.8 meter length of the Trident II SLBM first stage, declared for first stages, in such configuration, of these missiles, is the distance from the extreme point of the aft end dome of the motor case to the extreme point of the forward end dome of the motor case, without taking into account protruding elements attached to such end domes of the motor case.

The Parties understand that no later than five days after entry into force of this Joint Statement the United States of America will provide texts of footnotes specifying the length declared for the first stage without nozzles attached of each of these missiles in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty. In this connection, the respective numbers of the footnotes will be superscripted after the first mention of the first stage length of the corresponding ICBM or SLBM type in subparagraph (b)(i) or (b)(ii) of Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding. The United States of America will also provide a photograph of the first stage, in such configuration, of each of these missiles, that meets the criteria provided for in paragraph 10 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding, either on the date when this Joint Statement is initialed, or through diplomatic channels no later than 48 hours after the notification specified in this paragraph is provided, or during the first inspection at which a first stage, in such configuration, of each of these missiles is encountered.

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*United States Department of State*

The Parties agree that, during the first inspection at which a first stage, in such configuration, of each of these missiles is encountered, the inspecting Party shall have the right to confirm that the length of such a first stage corresponds to the length declared for the first stage without nozzles attached of an ICBM or SLBM of that type in Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding, using procedures provided for in Annexes 8 and 11 to the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty applicable to measuring the distance from the extreme point of the aft end dome of the motor case to the extreme point of the forward end dome of the motor case, without taking into account protruding elements attached to such end domes of the motor case. The inspecting Party shall also have the right during such inspection and subsequent inspections to confirm the type of ICBM or SLBM by external viewing and by measurement of the dimensions of such a first stage without nozzles attached of an ICBM or SLBM.

[Initialed]

(United States of America)\_\_\_ Steven Steiner  
(Republic of Belarus)\_\_\_ Andrey Sannikov  
(Republic of Kazakstan)\_\_\_ Kairtay Zhanbatyrov  
(Russian Federation)\_\_\_ Viktor Trifonov  
(Ukraine)\_\_\_ Konstantin Hrishchenko

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Geneva, Switzerland  
May 8, 1996

**JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION  
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER 24**

**ON FIRST STAGES WITHOUT NOZZLES ATTACHED OF SS-24 ICBMS**

The Parties, referring to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, understand that, during data update inspections, new facility inspections, or conversion or elimination inspections, first stages without nozzles attached of SS-24 ICBMs may be located at conversion or elimination facilities.

The Parties understand that a photograph of the first stage, in such configuration, of each variant of the SS-24 ICBM and declared data on the length of the first stage without nozzle attached of each variant of the SS-24 ICBM, which will be provided to the United States of America, may be used by the inspecting Party during data update inspections, new facility inspections, or conversion or elimination inspections only for the purpose of confirming this type and variant of ICBM at conversion or elimination facilities.

The Parties understand that the 7.3 meter length of the first stage of the SS-24 ICBM for rail mobile launcher and the 7.1 meter length of the first stage of the SS-24 ICBM for silo launcher, declared for first stages, in such configuration, of these variants of the SS-24 ICBM, is the distance from the extreme point of the aft end dome of the motor case to the extreme point of the forward end dome of

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*United States Department of State*

the motor case, without taking into account protruding elements attached to such end domes of the motor case.

The Parties understand that no later than five days after entry into force of this Joint Statement Ukraine will provide texts of footnotes specifying the length declared for the first stage without nozzle attached of each variant of the SS-24 ICBM in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty. In this connection, the respective numbers of the footnotes will be superscripted after the first mention of the first stage length of the corresponding variant of this ICBM type in subparagraph (a)(i) of Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding. Except as provided below, Ukraine will also provide a photograph of the first stage, in such configuration, of each variant of the SS-24 ICBM, that meets the criteria provided for in paragraph 10 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding, either on the date when this Joint Statement is initialed, or through diplomatic channels no later than 48 hours after the notification specified in this paragraph is provided, or during the first inspection on the territory of Ukraine at which a first stage, in such configuration, of that variant of the SS-24 ICBM is encountered. If the first stage, in such configuration, of a variant of the SS-24 ICBM is first encountered during an inspection on the territory of the Russian Federation, the Russian Federation will, during that inspection, provide a photograph of the first stage, in such configuration, of that variant of the SS-24 ICBM, unless Ukraine provided a photograph of that variant earlier.

The Parties agree that, during the first inspection at which a first stage, in such configuration, of each variant of the SS-24 ICBM is encountered, the inspecting Party shall have the right to confirm that the length of such a first stage corresponds to the length declared for the first stage without nozzle attached of that variant of the SS-24 ICBM in Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding, using procedures provided for in Annexes 8 and 11 to the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty applicable to measuring the distance from the extreme point of the aft end dome of the motor case to the extreme point of the forward end dome of the motor case, without taking into account protruding elements attached to such end domes of the motor case. The inspecting Party shall also have the right during such inspection and subsequent inspections to confirm the type and variant of ICBM by external viewing and by measurement of the dimensions of such a first stage without nozzle attached of a variant of the SS-24 ICBM.

[Initialed]

(United States of America)\_\_\_ Steven Steiner  
(Republic of Belarus)\_\_\_ Andrey Sannikov  
(Republic of Kazakstan)\_\_\_ Kairtay Zhanbatyrov  
(Russian Federation)\_\_\_ Viktor Trifonov  
(Ukraine)\_\_\_ Konstantin Hrishchenko

Geneva, Switzerland  
October 30, 1996

**JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION  
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER 25**

**ON MEASURING ITEMS OF INSPECTION IN CONTAINERS, VEHICLES, OR  
ICBM EMPLACEMENT EQUIPMENT**

The Parties, referring to Annex 1 to the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, understand that when an item of inspection is encountered in a container, vehicle, or ICBM emplacement equipment during any inspection, inspectors may use indirect measurement procedures to measure the dimensions of the item of inspection. The indirect measurement procedures shall include making measurements of the distance between locations designated by a member of the in-country escort on the item of inspection and on the container, vehicle, or ICBM emplacement equipment. The results of such measurements shall be added or subtracted, as appropriate, to determine the dimensions of the item of inspection.

The Parties understand that measurements of an item of inspection in a container, vehicle, or ICBM emplacement equipment may be taken with the use of additional equipment provided by the inspected Party.

The Parties understand that, for the purposes of confirming the type of an item of inspection contained in ICBM emplacement equipment, or the absence of an item of inspection therefrom, the procedures provided for in paragraph 9 of Annex 1 to the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty shall be used.

[Initialed]  
(United States of America)\_\_\_ Steven Steiner  
(Republic of Belarus)\_\_\_ Andrey Sannikov  
(Republic of Kazakstan)\_\_\_ Kairtay Zhanbatyrov  
(Russian Federation)\_\_\_ Viktor Trifonov  
(Ukraine)\_\_\_ Anatoliy Shevtsov

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Geneva, Switzerland  
October 30, 1996

**JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION  
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER 26**

**ON CONFIRMING TYPES OF ICBMS AND SLBMS**

The Parties, referring to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of

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*United States Department of State  
Revised: 5/02*

Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, understand that when, during data update inspections or new facility inspections, first stages of ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages are located at declared facilities attached to other stages of such ICBMs or SLBMs, the type of an ICBM or SLBM in such a configuration may be confirmed by viewing and measuring the dimensions of the first stage of such an ICBM or SLBM using the procedures provided for in Annex 1 to the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol. The length of such a first stage is the distance set forth in subparagraph 14(b) of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding.

*The Parties understand that when ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, transported, as assembled missile in launch canisters or without launch canisters are located for the purpose of elimination at conversion or elimination facilities, or when such ICBMs, other than ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, or such SLBMs are located for the purpose of elimination at another declared facility disassembled into stages or in a state in which one or more assemblies or elements constituting the assembled missile without front section have been removed, the type of ICBM or SLBM in such a configuration may be confirmed during data update inspections or new facility inspections by viewing and measuring the dimensions of the first stage of such an ICBM or SLBM using the procedures provided for in paragraph 2 of Annex 1 to the Inspection Protocol.<sup>1</sup> The length of such a first stage is the distance set forth in subparagraph 14(a) of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding.*

The Parties understand that for the purposes of paragraph 1 of Subsection A of Section VI of Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol, the places set forth in subparagraph 14(a) or 14(b) of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding, as applicable, that are used for measuring the length of the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM, are the extreme points of the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM.

[Initialed]

(United States of America)\_\_\_ Steven Steiner  
(Republic of Belarus)\_\_\_ Andrey Sannikov  
(Republic of Kazakstan)\_\_\_ Kairtay Zhanbatyrov  
(Russian Federation)\_\_\_ Viktor Trifonov  
(Ukraine)\_\_\_ Anatoliy Shevtsov

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<sup>1</sup> JCIC Joint Statement No. 30, July 29, 1998

Geneva, Switzerland  
June 17, 1997

**JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION  
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER 27**

**ON CHANGES TO JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION  
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER S-1**

The Parties, referring to paragraph 20 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, agree that paragraph (2) of Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Joint Statement Number S-1 shall be superseded by the following provision:

"(2) The portions of the Teykovo ICBM Base for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs to be excluded, pursuant to this Joint Statement, from within the boundary shown on the site diagram of the facility dated March 20, 1995, shall not be subject to inspection unless such portions are included within the boundary of any inspection site."

[Initialed]

(United States of America)\_\_\_ Steven Steiner  
(Republic of Belarus)\_\_\_ Stanislav Ogurtsov  
(Republic of Kazakstan)\_\_\_ Kairtay Zhanbatyrov  
(Russian Federation)\_\_\_ Anton Vasil'yev  
(Ukraine)\_\_\_ Konstantin Hrishchenko

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Geneva, Switzerland  
November 12, 1997

**JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION  
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER 28**

**ON THE USE OF TAMPER DETECTION EQUIPMENT**

The Parties, referring to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, understand that the inspecting Party shall be permitted to bring to points of entry at which radiation detection equipment is stored equipment for determining whether the containers in which radiation detection equipment is stored have been tampered with, hereinafter referred to as tamper detection equipment. The inspecting Party shall provide through diplomatic channels to the inspected Party a list of such tamper detection equipment, indicating the manufacturer's name and the model, prior to the first time such tamper detection equipment is brought to the territory of the inspected Party after the entry into force of this Joint

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*United States Department of State*

Statement. The inspecting Party shall be permitted to substitute tamper detection equipment of a different manufacturer or model. The inspecting Party shall provide an updated list of such tamper detection equipment prior to substitution.

The Parties understand that tamper detection equipment that is brought to a point of entry shall be subject to examination by the inspected Party to confirm that the manufacturer's name and the model of such tamper detection equipment correspond to those specified on the list provided by the inspected Party.

The Parties understand that tamper detection equipment may be used only at the point of entry and only for the purpose of determining whether the containers have been tampered with, as provided for in paragraph 4 of Section I of Annex 15 to the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol, and may not be taken to any inspection site. A member of the in-country escort shall have the right to be present when tamper detection equipment is used.

The Parties understand that the provisions of subparagraph 7(c) of Section II of the Inspection Protocol shall apply to the recordings of data generated by tamper detection equipment.

The Parties understand that tamper detection equipment shall be removed from the point of entry at the end of the in-country period of the inspection team that brought such tamper detection equipment to the point of entry. However, if another inspection team that could use such tamper detection equipment is within the territory of the inspected Party at the end of such period, the tamper detection equipment shall be removed at the end of the in-country period of that inspection team.

[Initialed]

(United States of America)\_\_\_ Steven Steiner  
(Republic of Belarus)\_\_\_ Stanislav Ogurtsov  
(Republic of Kazakhstan)<sup>1</sup>\_\_\_ Kairtay Zhanbatyrov  
(Russian Federation)\_\_\_ Anton Vasil'yev  
(Ukraine)\_\_\_ Konstantin Hrishchenko

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Geneva, Switzerland  
March 17, 1998

**JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION  
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER 29  
ON SS-24 ICBMS AND THEIR FIRST STAGES  
WITH COUPLING DEVICE ATTACHED**

The Parties, referring to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty,

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<sup>1</sup> Revised official spelling.

understand that the SS-24 ICBM uses a device that connects the missile with its launch canister, hereinafter referred to as the coupling device, which is attached to the first stage motor and covers the main engine nozzle. The Parties understand that, during data update inspections or new facility inspections, SS-24 ICBMs and their first stages may be located at conversion or elimination facilities in the following configurations: as assembled missiles without front sections with the coupling device attached; and as separate first stages with the coupling device attached.

The Parties understand that photographs of the missile and the first stage, in such configurations, of each variant of the SS-24 ICBM and declared data on the length of the missile and the first stage, in such configurations, of each variant of the SS-24 ICBM, which will be provided to the United States of America, may be used by the inspecting Party during data update inspections or new facility inspections only for the purpose of confirming this type and variant of ICBM at conversion or elimination facilities.

The Parties understand that the 19.3 meter length of the SS-24 ICBM for rail-mobile launcher and the 19.3 meter length of the SS-24 ICBM for silo launcher, declared for assembled missiles without front sections, in such configuration, of these variants of the SS-24 ICBM, is the distance from the extreme point of the coupling device to the place where the missile joins the front section.

The Parties understand that the 8.7 meter length of the first stage of the SS-24 ICBM for rail-mobile launcher and the 8.8 meter length of the first stage of the SS-24 ICBM for silo launcher, declared for first stages, in such configuration, of these variants of the SS-24 ICBM, is the distance from the extreme point of the coupling device to the extreme point of the forward end dome of the motor case.

The Parties understand that no later than five days after entry into force of this Joint Statement Ukraine will provide texts of footnotes specifying the length declared for the missile and its first stage, in such configurations, of each variant of the SS-24 ICBM in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty. In this connection, the respective numbers of the footnotes will be superscripted after the first mention of the length of the assembled missile without front section and of the length of the first stage of the corresponding variant of this ICBM type in subparagraph (a)(i) of Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding.

Except as provided below, Ukraine will also provide photographs of the missile and its first stage, in such configurations, of each variant of the SS-24 ICBM, that meet the criteria provided for in paragraph 10 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding, either on the date when this Joint Statement is initialed, or through diplomatic channels no later than 48 hours after the notification specified in the preceding paragraph is provided, or during the first inspection on the territory of Ukraine during which the missile or its first stage, in such configuration, of that variant of the SS-24 ICBM is encountered, unless such photographs have been provided previously. If the missile or its first stage, in such configuration, or a variant of the SS-24 ICBM is first encountered during

an inspection on the territory of the Russian Federation, the Russian Federation will, during that inspection, provide a photograph of the missile or its first stage, in such configuration, of that variant of the SS-24 ICBM, as applicable, unless Ukraine has provided a photograph of that variant earlier.

The Parties agree that, during the first inspection at which a missile or its first stage, in such configuration, of each variant of the SS-24 ICBM is encountered, the inspecting Party shall have the right to confirm that the length of such a missile or its first stage corresponds to the length declared for the missile or its first stage, in such configuration, of that variant of the SS-24 ICBM in Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding, using procedures provided for in Annexes 8 and 11 to the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty applicable to measuring the distance from the extreme point of the coupling device to the place where the missile joins the front section or from the extreme point of the coupling device to the extreme point of the forward end dome of the motor case of the first stage, as applicable.

The inspecting Party shall also have the right during such inspection and subsequent inspections to confirm the type and variant of ICBM by external viewing and by measurement of the dimensions of the missile or first stage, in such configuration, of a variant of the SS-24 ICBM.

[Initialed]

(United States of America)\_\_\_ Steven Steiner

(Republic of Belarus)\_\_\_ Stanislav Ogurtsov

(Republic of Kazakhstan)\_\_\_ Kairtay Zhanbatyrov

(Russian Federation)\_\_\_ Anton Vasil'yev

(Ukraine)\_\_\_ Anatoliy Shevtsov

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Geneva, Switzerland

July 29, 1998

**JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION  
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER 30**

**ON CHANGES TO JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION  
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER 26**

The Parties, referring to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, agree that the first sentence of the second paragraph of Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Joint Statement Number 26 shall be superseded by the following provision:

“The Parties understand that when ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters or without launch canisters are located for the purpose of elimination at conversion or elimination facilities, or when such ICBMs, other than ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, or such SLBMs are located for the purpose of elimination at

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*United States Department of State  
Revised: 5/02*

another declared facility disassembled into stages or in a state in which one or more assemblies or elements constituting the assembled missile without front section have been removed, the type of ICBM or SLBM in such a configuration may be confirmed during data update inspections or new facility inspections by viewing and measuring the dimensions of the first stage of such an ICBM or SLBM using the procedures provided for in paragraph 2 of Annex 1 to the Inspection Protocol.”

[Initialed]

(United States of America)\_\_\_ Steven Steiner  
(Republic of Belarus)\_\_\_ Stanislav Ogurtsov  
(Republic of Kazakhstan)\_\_\_ Kairtay Zhanbatyrov  
(Russian Federation)\_\_\_ Anton Vasil'yev  
(Ukraine)\_\_\_ Aleksey Rybak

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Geneva, Switzerland  
March 3, 1999

**JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION  
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER 31**

**ON PROVISION IN ADVANCE OF DATA ON SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLES**

The Parties, referring to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, and Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Joint Statement Number 21 on Space Launch Vehicles that Incorporate First Stages of ICBMs or SLBMs, hereinafter referred to as Joint Statement Number 21, understand that the technical data required by Joint Statement Number 21 to be provided in advance regarding ICBMs or SLBMs used to deliver objects into the upper atmosphere or space, including space launch vehicles that incorporate the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM, hereinafter referred to as space launch vehicles, shall include, at a minimum, the following categories of data:

- (a) Name or designation of the space launch vehicle;
- (b) Type of ICBM or SLBM whose first stage is incorporated into the space launch vehicle;
- (c) Total number of stages;
- (d) For an upper stage of the space launch vehicle that is an ICBM or SLBM stage, the type and stage of that ICBM or SLBM;
- (e) For space launch vehicles not contained in launch canisters, length of assembled space launch vehicle with or without payload fairing;

- (f) For space launch vehicles contained in launch canisters, total length of space launch vehicle as a unit with launch canister with or without payload fairing;
- (g) For space launch vehicles that are transported in separate launch canister sections, length of launch canister sections;
- (h) Length and diameter of launch canister, if applicable;
- (i) Description of launcher type/launch method; and
- (j) Calculated value, for reference purposes, of the weight of the fully-fueled space launch vehicle without payload.

Notwithstanding the above provisions, technical data in the aforementioned categories shall not be required to be provided unless it differs from the data for that type of ICBM or SLBM already set forth in Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty.

The Parties understand that, if not provided earlier, the technical data, development plans and photographs or schematic drawings required by Joint Statement 21 shall be provided through diplomatic channels in a format determined by the Party providing such information, with a cover letter signed by a representative of that Party, no later than:

- (a) Ten days prior to the first exit of that space launch vehicle from a production facility for ICBMs or SLBMs;
- (b) Ten days prior to the first time that space launch vehicle is assembled at a facility other than a production facility, including a space launch facility; or
- (c) 30 days after the entry into force of this Joint Statement, whichever is latest.

[Initialed]

(United States of America)\_\_\_ Steven Steiner

(Republic of Belarus)\_\_\_ Stanislav Ogurtsov

(Republic of Kazakhstan)\_\_\_ Kairtay Zhanbatyrov

(Russian Federation)\_\_\_ Anton Vasil'yev

(Ukraine)\_\_\_ Aleksey Rybak

Geneva, Switzerland  
July 28, 1999

**JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION  
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER 32**

**ON LAUNCHERS, SUPPORT EQUIPMENT, AND LAUNCH CANISTERS AT  
SPACE LAUNCH FACILITIES DECLARED OUTSIDE NATIONAL TERRITORY**

The Parties, referring to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, understand that:

- (a) Each Party shall return to its national territory launchers, support equipment, and launch canisters belonging to it and moved by it to a space launch facility declared outside its national territory prior to the elimination of that space launch facility in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section IX of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Items Subject to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.
- (b) The Party which conducted the launch or launches may refurbish and reuse launch canisters that have been returned from such a space launch facility.
- (c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph (a), each Party may, when necessary, eliminate support equipment and launch canisters belonging to it, and moved by it, to such a space launch facility prior to the elimination of that facility. Support equipment shall be eliminated *in situ* in the open using procedures at the discretion of the Party which conducted the launch or launches. Launch canisters remaining after the launch or launches that are not returned to the national territory of that Party shall be eliminated *in situ* in the open using the procedures set forth in paragraph 5 of Section I of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, except for the process of elimination by explosion. Devices, specified in subparagraphs 2(b), 2(c), and 2(e) of Section I of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, which are located on or in such launch canisters, may be removed before the elimination process for these launch canisters begins. Such launch canisters shall remain visible to national technical means of verification during the entire elimination process and the remains of such launch canisters shall remain visible to national technical means of verification until removed from such space launch facility for return by the Party to its national territory.
- (d) Elimination of support equipment and launch canisters and removal of devices in accordance with subparagraph (c) shall be carried out by the personnel of the Party that conducted the launch or launches.

- (e) Prior to the elimination of such a space launch facility, the remains of eliminated support equipment and launch canisters, as well as devices removed from launch canisters in accordance with subparagraph (c), shall be returned to the territory of the Party that conducted the launch or launches.
- (f) A Party shall retain ownership and control of each launch canister moved by it to such a space launch facility during its movement to such a space launch facility, as well as each launch canister and the remains of such a launch canister eliminated *in situ* while they are located at such a space launch facility and during their return to its national territory.

Each Party, in addition to those notifications provided for in paragraph 1 of Section II of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, will provide the other Parties through diplomatic channels, or through their respective continuous communication centers, no less than five days in advance of the scheduled date of departure from such a space launch facility of launchers, launch canisters, and support equipment, or the remains of such launch canisters and support equipment, the following information: the number and type of items involved; the facility from which the items are to depart; the anticipated date of departure; the mode of transport; for those items subject to the provisions of paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty, the declared facility to which such items are to be transported, and the anticipated date of their arrival at such a facility; and for items that are not subject to the provisions of paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty, the anticipated date of their arrival in the national territory of the Party.

[Initialed]  
(United States of America)\_\_\_ Steven Steiner  
(Republic of Belarus)\_\_\_ Valentin Rybakov  
(Republic of Kazakhstan)\_\_\_ Kairtay Zhanbatyrov  
(Russian Federation)\_\_\_ Anton Vasil'yev  
(Ukraine)\_\_\_ Aleksey Rybak

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Geneva, Switzerland  
March 8, 2000

**JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION  
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER 33**

**ON HEAVY BOMBERS AND FORMER HEAVY BOMBERS DISABLED  
BEYOND REPAIR**

The Parties, referring to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, understand that, for a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber, the expression "disabled beyond repair" in paragraph 3 of Section VIII of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Items Subject to the

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*United States Department of State  
Revised: 5/02*

Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, refers to any condition of a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber that, in the judgment of the possessing Party, precludes its repair and prevents it from flying safely to a conversion or elimination facility for its elimination.

The Parties understand that, pursuant to subparagraph 3(b) of Section VIII of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, a heavy bomber or a former heavy bomber that is declared to be disabled beyond repair remains accountable as a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber until such time as it is eliminated, at the site of disablement or at a conversion or elimination facility, in accordance with the applicable procedures provided for in Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, including inspection.

The Parties agree that, when a Party determines that a heavy bomber or a former heavy bomber is disabled beyond repair, the Party shall provide notification thereof in accordance with subparagraph 3(a) of Section VIII of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol prior to notifying the intent to eliminate it at the site of disablement or at a conversion or elimination facility. Such notification shall specify the number of items that are disabled beyond repair at such site or facility.

The Parties agree that, in its notifications of updated data in each of the data categories contained in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding, a Party shall identify heavy bombers and former heavy bombers declared to be disabled beyond repair by use of an asterisk after the total number of such heavy bombers and former heavy bombers listed and a footnote at the end of the Memorandum of Understanding entry for the facility at which such heavy bombers and former heavy bombers are declared, indicating that such heavy bombers and former heavy bombers have been declared disabled beyond repair. This footnote shall indicate the locations of such heavy bombers and former heavy bombers and where they will be eliminated.

[Initialed]

(United States of America)\_\_\_ Steven Steiner  
(Republic of Belarus)\_\_\_ Valentin Rybakov  
(Republic of Kazakstan)\_\_\_ Kairtay Zhanbatyrov  
(Russian Federation)\_\_\_ Anton Vasil'yev  
(Ukraine)\_\_\_ Oleg Semenets

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Geneva, Switzerland  
December 11, 2000

**JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION  
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER 34**

**ON PHASED ELIMINATION OF SS-24 ICBMs LOCATED IN UKRAINE**

The Parties, referring to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of

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*United States Department of State  
Revised: 5/02*

Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, pursuant to paragraph 1 of Section I of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Items Subject to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Conversion or Elimination Protocol,

Have agreed as follows:

1. The elimination of SS-24 ICBMs and their launch canisters may be carried out in two phases. Each such elimination phase shall be carried out at the Pavlograd Conversion or Elimination Facility for ICBMs and shall be subject to inspection.
  - (a) During the first elimination phase the launch canisters and all missile elements subject to elimination from no less than five and no more than eight missiles, except for the missile stages without nozzles attached, shall be eliminated during a single inspection, unless fewer than five missiles to be eliminated in phases remain.
  - (b) During the second elimination phase, after the propellant has been removed from the rocket motor cases without nozzles attached, such rocket motor cases from no less than five and no more than eight missiles shall be eliminated during a single inspection, unless rocket motor cases from fewer than five missiles to be eliminated in phases remain.
2. For the phased elimination of the SS-24 ICBMs and their launch canisters, inspectors shall make the observations and measurements necessary to confirm the type and, if applicable, variant of the type, of the missiles to be eliminated, subject to the provisions of this Joint Statement and paragraphs 3 and 6 of Section I of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.
3. The Annex to this Joint Statement provides a list of the missile elements subject to elimination, and their dimensions to be confirmed during a phased elimination inspection, including the individual lengths of the portions of such missile elements that, when their lengths are added together, constitute the length of the assembled missile without front section, declared in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding.
4. The inspected Party shall provide information that will enable each missile element subject to elimination to be associated with the missile's unique identifier. Such information for each missile shall be provided prior to the first inspection conducted with respect to the phased elimination of that missile and shall be subject to confirmation by the inspecting Party during conversion or elimination inspections conducted with respect to the phased elimination of that missile.
5. For the first elimination phase:
  - (a) The inspecting Party, immediately prior to the initiation of the elimination of the missile elements subject to elimination, shall have the right to:

- (i) Confirm the number and the type, and if applicable, variant of the type, of the missiles to be eliminated, by external viewing and by measurement, at locations specified by a member of the in-country escort, of the diameter of each stage, and the length of the portions of all such missile elements, that together constitute the length of the assembled missile without front section. Rocket motors of missile stages shall not be required to be located in the immediate vicinity of the missile elements being eliminated during that inspection, but shall be subject to viewing and measuring in the areas in which they are stored.
  - (ii) Confirm missile elements subject to elimination that do not contribute to the length of the assembled missile without front section individually by external viewing from a location specified by a member of the in-country escort.
  - (iii) Confirm the association of the missile elements subject to elimination with the unique identifier of the missile to be eliminated.
- (b) For rocket motor nozzles, the inspected Party shall have the right prior to the initiation of viewing to cover the nozzles with covers in such a manner that these covers shall not hamper inspectors in the viewing and measuring of the nozzle of the first stage, and that they shall not hamper the viewing of the nozzles of the second and third stages. During the demonstration provided for in paragraph 7 of this Joint Statement, the inspected Party shall demonstrate the placement of such covers to the satisfaction of the inspecting Party.
- (c) If inspectors are unable to determine the type of the missile to be eliminated or the missile elements subject to elimination, by viewing and measuring the missile elements, representatives of the inspected Party shall take steps to resolve the problem.
6. For the second phase of elimination:
- (a) The inspecting Party, immediately prior to the initiation of the elimination of the rocket motor cases of missile stages without nozzles attached, shall have the right to:
    - (i) Confirm individually the dimensions of such rocket motor cases by external viewing and by measurement, at locations specified by a member of the in-country escort, of the diameter and of the length that contributes to the length of the assembled missile without front section for the first and second stages and the length and diameter of the rocket motor case of the third stage at its extreme points.
    - (ii) Confirm the association of such rocket motor cases with the unique identifier of the missile to be eliminated.

- (b) If inspectors are unable to identify the rocket motor cases by viewing and measuring them, representatives of the inspected Party shall take steps to resolve the problem.

7. The inspected Party, immediately prior to the initiation of the first inspection conducted with respect to the phased elimination of SS-24 ICBMs, shall conduct a demonstration of all missile elements subject to elimination for each variant of the SS-24 ICBM and its launch canister. During such a demonstration, the inspecting Party shall have the right to confirm that the length of each such missile element corresponds to the length declared for that missile element for that variant of the SS-24 ICBM in the Annex to this Joint Statement, using equipment and procedures provided for in Annexes 8 and 11 to the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol. The inspecting Party shall also have the right to compare the unique identifiers on the launch canister and the first stage of each such missile.

8. The inspected Party shall provide to the inspecting Party, for each variant of the SS-24 ICBM, photographs of the missile elements subject to elimination, the lengths of which do not contribute to the length of the assembled missile without front section. Such photographs shall meet the criteria provided for in paragraph 10 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding, and shall be provided no later than the beginning of the demonstration conducted in accordance with paragraph 7 of this Joint Statement.

9. The inspecting Party shall have the right to use the data provided in the Annex to this Joint Statement and the photographs of the missile elements subject to elimination for each variant of the SS-24 ICBM provided in accordance with this Joint Statement during conversion or elimination inspections for the purpose of confirming the type of ICBM and the missile elements subject to elimination. The results of each measurement of the dimensions that deviate by no more than three percent from the relevant data provided in the Annex to this Joint Statement shall be considered acceptable.

10. For an inspection conducted in accordance with this Joint Statement, the word "item" in subparagraph 4(c) of Section XI of the Inspection Protocol refers to the missile elements subject to elimination.

11. For an inspection conducted in accordance with this Joint Statement, the provisions of paragraph 1 of Section XVIII of the Inspection Protocol shall apply to the missile elements subject to elimination. The inspection report shall include the number of items subject to inspection which were observed during the inspection period, information that was used to associate the missile elements with the missile's unique identifier, and all measurements taken to confirm the dimensions of the missile elements provided in the Annex to this Joint Statement.

12. The Parties understand that the provisions of paragraph 7 of Section I of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol shall be considered to have been fulfilled and the missile shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty, once all the elements of the missile subject to elimination and its launch

canister have been confirmed in accordance with this Joint Statement, the elimination processes for such missile elements and the launch canister in subparagraphs 4(b) and 4(c) and paragraph 5 of Section I of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol have been completed and observed by the inspecting Party, and the inspection report has been completed in accordance with paragraph 6 of Section I of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol for the second phase of the elimination for that missile.

[Initialed]

(United States of America)\_\_\_ Steven Steiner  
 (Republic of Belarus)\_\_\_ Valentin Rybakov  
 (Republic of Kazakstan)\_\_\_ Kairtay Zhanbatyrov  
 (Russian Federation)\_\_\_ Mikhail Strel'tsov  
 (Ukraine)\_\_\_ Oleg Semenets

## ANNEX

### List of Elements of the SS-24 ICBM and Its Launch Canister Subject to Elimination During Phased Elimination

- I. Elements to be eliminated during the first phase of elimination.
  - (a) Elements that shall be measured for the confirmation of ICBM type:
    1. First stage interstage skirt
 

length (meters)	0.26
diameter (meters)	2.4
    2. Second stage interstage skirt
 

length (meters)	1.61
diameter (meters)	2.4
    3. Third stage interstage skirt
 

length (meters)	3.1
diameter (meters)	2.4
    4. Self-contained dispensing mechanism (without propulsion unit)
 

length (meters)	2.2
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    5. First stage nozzle
 

length (meters)	1.06/1.01*
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    6. Launch canister (upper section)
 

length (meters)	10.6
diameter (meters)	2.7

## 7. Launch canister (lower section)

length (meters)	8.3
diameter (meters)	2.7

## (b) Elements that shall be viewed externally for the purpose of their identification:

1. Second stage nozzle
2. Third stage nozzle
3. Front section shroud
4. Re-entry vehicle platform
5. Tail section of first stage

## II. Elements to be eliminated during the second phase of elimination that shall be measured:

## 1. First stage rocket motor case without nozzle attached

length (meters)	6.7/6.9*
diameter (meters)	2.4

## 2. Second stage rocket motor case without nozzle attached

length (meters)	3.9
diameter (meters)	2.4

## 3. Third stage rocket motor case without nozzle attached

length (meters)	2.4**
diameter (meters)	2.3

\* Dimensional measurements of elements of the SS-24 ICBM for rail-mobile launcher.

\*\* Length of the third stage rocket motor case is the distance from the extreme point of the aft end dome of the case to the extreme point of the forward end dome of the case, not counting protruding elements attached to such motor case end domes.

Geneva, Switzerland  
July 17, 2001

**JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION  
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER 35**

**ON CONFIRMING THAT COVERT ASSEMBLY OF ICBMS FOR MOBILE  
LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS OR COVERT ASSEMBLY OF FIRST STAGES OF  
SUCH ICBMS IS NOT OCCURRING AT FACILITIES SUBJECT TO  
SUSPECT-SITE INSPECTIONS**

The Parties, referring to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, understand that a Party has the right to locate ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs or first stages of such ICBMs within any portion of a facility subject to suspect-site inspections that is within a facility where that Party has the right to locate such ICBMs or first stages of such ICBMs. To assist inspectors in ascertaining that covert assembly of such ICBMs or covert assembly of first stages of such ICBMs is not occurring at such facilities subject to suspect-site inspections, the Parties agree that, in addition to the right to use the procedures set forth in Annex 1 to the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol, inspectors shall have the right to read and record the data from the unique identifiers on all such ICBMs or first stages of such ICBMs, using the procedures set forth in Annex 6 to the Inspection Protocol, and the right to confirm that items declared to be training models of missiles are training models of missiles.

In order to facilitate the conduct of suspect-site inspections at such facilities, upon arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site, a member of the in-country escort shall inform the inspection team leader of the number and types of such ICBMs and first stages of such ICBMs at the inspection site. At the same time, a member of the in-country escort shall provide the inspection team leader with a copy of the site diagram of the inspection site, annotated to indicate the location at the inspection site of such items and the structures or vehicles in which they are located.

The Parties understand that the location of previously declared ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs or first stages of such ICBMs within any portion of a facility subject to suspect-site inspections that is within a facility where that Party has the right to locate such ICBMs or first stages of such ICBMs is not evidence that covert assembly of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs or covert assembly of first stages of such ICBMs is occurring.

[Initialed]

(United States of America)\_\_\_ Steven Steiner

(Republic of Belarus)\_\_\_ Valeriy Kolesnik

(Republic of Kazakhstan)\_\_\_ Nurlan Danenov

(Russian Federation)\_\_\_ Anton Vasil'yev

(Ukraine)\_\_\_ Anatoliy Shcherba

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*United States Department of State*